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I. INTRODUCTION
The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions except for substantial leg-
islative revisions to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA)
discussed below in Section X.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court weighed in on a
variety of subject matter jurisdiction issues. To begin, the Texas Supreme
Court made clear in Garcia v. City of Willis that past injury will not, by
itself, support standing to bring claims for prospective relief, holding that
a plaintiff instead must demonstrate a particularized, “imminent [future]
harm” or injury “for standing that prospective relief requires.”1 The
plaintiff there sought prospective relief related to the city’s red-light cam-
era enforcement scheme in the form of declarations that the regulations
were unconstitutional and “ultra vires” enactments, along with an injunc-
tion against future enforcement.2 While acknowledging the plaintiff’s
* B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law. Partner, Figari + Davenport, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner, Figari
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1. Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 207–08 (Tex. 2019).
2. Id. at 207.
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standing to assert claims seeking retrospective relief,3 the supreme court
held that he lacked standing to bring prospective claims because he “paid
the requisite civil fine,” “has not pleaded that he is subject to any out-
standing violation notices that would cause him imminent harm,” and
“has not argued he plans to violate red-light laws in the future.”4 Without
showing an imminent injury that would be redressed by the prospective
relief sought, the supreme court reasoned that the plaintiff had no more
interest in the city’s enforcement scheme than the “public at large.”5 That
general, unparticularized interest was not enough to confer standing to
seek prospective relief, and those claims were thus dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.6
In two other cases, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the presump-
tion against finding that mandatory statutory deadlines are jurisdictional
and recognized due process limitations on strict enforcement of even ju-
risdictional deadlines. In Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chicas, the su-
preme court held that the forty-five day deadline to seek judicial review
of a workers’ compensation appeals panel decision is mandatory, but not
jurisdictional.7 In doing so, the supreme court reaffirmed its Dubai Petro-
leum Co. v. Kazi8 and In re United Services Auto Ass’n9 holdings, reiter-
ated that courts’ focus should be to “reduce the vulnerability of final
judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter
jurisdiction,”10 and overruled a number of courts of appeals that had held
otherwise.11
3. Id. In addition to prospective relief, the plaintiff also sought “retrospective relief
through a claim for reimbursement of the civil penalty he paid” and an alternative takings
claim. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Specifically, the supreme court reasoned: “[Plaintiff] may earnestly believe that
red-light cameras are both unconstitutional and bad public policy. But, having paid his fine
without arguing he will potentially break the law in the future, he has no particularized
interest in the issue distinguishable from a member of the public at large.” Id.
6. Id. at 208.
7. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 287–91 (Tex. 2019) (discussing the
forty-five day deadline to file suit in TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.252(a) and explaining the
factors courts should consider in evaluating whether there is “clear legislative intent to
overcome the presumption that the requirement is not jurisdictional”).
8. 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000) (overruling Mingus v. Wadley, 285 S.W. 1084 (Tex.
1926) “to the extent that it characterized the plaintiff’s failure to establish a statutory pre-
requisite as jurisdictional”).
9. 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010) (explaining that, after Dubai, the supreme court
has “been ‘reluctant to conclude that a provision is jurisdictional, absent clear legislative
intent to that effect.’” (citation omitted)).
10. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 286.
11. Id. at 291 (to the extent of conflict, overruling Davis v. Am. Cas. Co., 408 S.W.3d 1,
6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied); Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Miranda, 293 S.W.3d
620, 624–25 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.); Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental
Risk Pool v. Burns, 209 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); LeBlanc v.
Everest Nat’l Ins. Co., 98 S.W.3d 786, 787 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no
pet.); Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 36 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet.
denied); Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 64 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001,
pet. denied); DeVore v. Am. Mfr.’s Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-07-00495-CV, 2008 WL 2611886,
at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 27, 2008, no pet.) (mem op.)).
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In the second statutory deadlines case this Survey period, Mosley v.
Texas Health and Human Services Commission, the Texas Supreme Court
held that “an agency’s misrepresentation of the proper procedures” to
satisfy a jurisdictional deadline violated a claimant’s due process rights
and required remand to allow her opportunity to fulfill the require-
ment.12 While noting that “Dubai and its progeny remain the standard for
prospective decisions concerning” whether a statutory requirement is ju-
risdictional,13 the supreme court relied on its prior holdings that the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act “motion-for-rehearing requirement14 is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from contested-case proceed-
ings.”15 The plaintiff failed to timely move for rehearing after the depart-
ment of protective services finally decided that she engaged in
“reportable conduct” in caring for a group-home resident.16 In the letter
accompanying the final decision, the agency advised the plaintiff the or-
der would become final unless she timely sought “judicial review,” did
not mention the motion-for-rehearing requirement, and “incorrectly
cited” a regulation that “incorrectly stated the law” on the necessary
steps to appeal the order.17 When plaintiff appealed the order by filing
suit as directed in the letter, the agency sought to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because she had not moved for rehearing.18 After
the Third Austin Court of Appeals refused to consider the “reportable
conduct” finding on the merits for lack of jurisdiction and rejected the
plaintiff’s due process argument, the supreme court granted review.19
With regard to plaintiff’s claim that she was deprived of the ability to
12. Mosley v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 254, 268 (Tex.
2019).
13. Id. at 261 n.3. The supreme court cited its Chicas decision discussed above but
noted: “[n]either party raises the question in this case whether [the statutory requirement
at issue] is not jurisdictional in light of more recent case law, so we have no reason to
revisit our holdings to that effect.” Id.
14. The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs proceedings before all Texas
agencies. Id. at 258. It provides “[a] person initiates judicial review in a contested case by
filing a petition not later than the 30th day after the date the decision or order that is the
subject of complaint is final and appealable.” Id. at 256 (quoting Mosley v. Tex. Health &
Human Servs. Comm’n, 517 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part 593 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2019) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(a) (emphasis
added))). Further, to appeal an agency decision in a contested case, the APA requires “[a]
timely motion for rehearing” as a “prerequisite,” such that an “appealable order” is “one
in which a motion for rehearing has been filed and overruled.” Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 2001.145(a), (b) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Taken together,
the supreme court found these APA provisions mandate “a motion for rehearing as a juris-
dictional prerequisite to judicial review” of an agency finding in contested proceedings. See
id. at 258–61.
15. Id. at 260.
16. Id. at 254–55 (discussing TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001, .403–.406 gov-
erning agency investigation and handling of “abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an elderly
person or person with a disability” reports). The finding of “reportable conduct” by plain-
tiff was to be published in a misconduct registry maintained by the licensing agency for
care facilities, and plaintiff’s “[p]lacement in the Registry is effectively career-ending.” See
id.
17. Id. at 255 n.1.
18. Id. at 257.
19. Id. at 262–68.
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challenge the order effectively ending her career as a “state-registered
nurse aid,”20 the supreme court emphasized that there is always a tension
between people’s duty to know the law and “the government’s constitu-
tional obligation to furnish due process.”21 Balancing those concerns, the
supreme court held that the “misrepresentations in the letter,” coupled
with the plaintiff’s showing that she detrimentally relied on them by do-
ing “exactly as the letter and rule directed,” violated her right to due
course of law.22 The supreme court therefore directed the agency to rein-
state the plaintiff’s case “to afford her an opportunity to seek rehearing
of the order” followed by judicial review in due course if rehearing was
denied.23
In addressing the scope of governmental immunity from liability for
actions taken “in connection with” specified activities, the Texas Supreme
Court construed that phrase and attendant scope of immunity broadly in
Tarrant County v. Bonner.24 The issue there was whether a county jail
could be liable for an inmate’s injury that occurred when the chair he
tried to use during his diabetes treatment collapsed.25 Four days earlier,
the chair had been damaged and placed in a locked, multipurpose room
to await disposal.26 The trial court granted summary judgment to the jail
based on two statutes protecting it from liability for negligent actions
taken “in connection with” inmates’ medical treatment.27 The Second
Fort Worth Court of Appeals found the immunity statutes did not apply
because the jail’s allegedly negligent acts of placing the chair in the room
without a warning were not connected to the inmate’s medical treat-
ment.28 The supreme court disagreed, explaining the phrase “in connec-
tion with” requires nothing more “than a tangential, tenuous, or remote
relationship between the connected items.”29 Because the inmate’s claim
“rests on the County’s alleged negligent acts and omissions intersecting
with his medical treatment,” the supreme court held they were suffi-
ciently connected for the statutes to apply.30 In other words, the supreme
court emphasized that these and similar statutes provide immunity for
negligent acts or omissions that are “reasonably related to the covered
20. Id. at 257.
21. Id. at 264.
22. Id. at 268.
23. Id. at 269.
24. 574 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. 2019).
25. Id. at 896.
26. The room was used for storage and occasionally other purposes like “nurses who
were brought to the jail to treat diabetic inmates.” Id. at 895.
27. Id. at 896–97 (citing and quoting TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.20 and
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 497.096).
28. Id. at 897.
29. Id. at 898 (noting it had a “similar view” as other authorities describing “in connec-
tion with” as “‘a vague, loose connective’” and a phrase “of ‘intentional breadth’”) (cita-
tions omitted)).
30. Id. at 899. Further, the supreme court reasoned its broad construction of the “in
connection with” language was consistent with its construction and application of the re-
lated Texas Torts Claims Act. Id. at 899–900.
2020] Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial 65
programs or activities, even when the relationship is indirect.”31 Having
found the statutes applied, the supreme court turned to whether the in-
mate raised a fact issue on the jail’s heightened “conscious indifference”
liability standard under them.32 Finding the inmate had not, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment in favor of the
jail.33
Under the Texas Torts Claims Act, the Texas Supreme Court held a
governmental worker’s failure to engage a van’s emergency parking
break raised a fact issue on waiver of sovereign immunity.34 While a med-
ical helicopter sat on a ground-level landing pad “securing a patient and
preparing for takeoff,” a state employee in a fifteen-passenger, state-
owned van dropped off two passengers at a hospital, parked “on an in-
cline near the helicopter,” and exited “without setting the emergency
break.”35 Shortly afterwards, the van began rolling backwards down the
incline and “crashed into the helicopter.”36 The helicopter owner sued
the state, which asserted immunity from suit.37 On interlocutory appeal, a
divided Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the van
must have been “in ‘active’ operation or use ‘at the time of the incident’”
for the state to waive immunity under the motor-vehicle-use-or-operation
waiver38 and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the helicopter
owner.39 The supreme court reversed and remanded back to the trial
court for further proceedings.40
The supreme court framed the dispute as “whether the damage to the
helicopter arose from the ‘operation or use’ of the van” in the context of
the owner’s claims related to the driver’s failure to engage the emergency
brake.41 As to the “arises from” causation requirement, the supreme
court held evidence that an officer investigated the accident and cited the
driver’s “failure to deploy the brake [as] a contributing factor in the colli-
sion” was sufficient to raise a fact issue on causation and “no more [was]
required” at that stage of proceedings.42 Next, the supreme court consid-
ered whether the driver’s alleged failure to engage the brake “qualifies as
31. Id. at 900.
32. Id. at 900–03.
33. Id. at 903.
34. PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juvenile Justice Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 306 (Tex. 2019).
35. Id. at 300.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 300–01.
38. Id. at 302 (citing and quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
101.021(1)(A), specifically the “Operation or Use of a Motor-Driven Vehicle” waiver,
which provides a “governmental unit in the state is liable for . . . property damage . . .
proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or negligence of an employee acting
within the scope of employment if . . . the property damage . . . arises from the operation or
use of a motor-driven vehicle . . . .”).
39. Id. at 301 (noting the court of appeals cited and relied on Ryder v. Integrated
Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cty., 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)).
40. Id. at 306–07.
41. Id. at 302.
42. Id. at 303.
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‘operation or use’ of the” van.43 On this point, the supreme court had no
trouble concluding “this ‘essential’ and ‘final’ aspect” of driving fell
“squarely within the textual parameters” of the statutory waiver.44 Fi-
nally, the supreme court harmonized this “operation and use” holding
with its prior decisions on the scope of the motor-vehicle-use-or-opera-
tion waiver emphasizing that “[u]nder the unusual facts,” the helicopter
owner “has alleged injury arising from operation or use of the vehicle
even though the driver was not behind the wheel at the moment the acci-
dent happened.”45
In another Texas Torts Claims Act case, the Texas Supreme Court dis-
cussed the scope of the discretionary function exception46 to the premises
defect waiver of immunity47 in a suit brought by the parents of a pregnant
woman who drowned when her footing slipped as she crossed a Trinity
River dam in Fort Worth.48 The parents alleged a kayak chute and other
features made the dam dangerous and the district knew of the danger
because there had been prior incidents at the location.49 After discussing
prior decisions on the “difficult ‘to meaningfully construe and consist-
ently apply’”50 exception, the supreme court emphasized that the excep-
tion’s “touchstone” is protection of governmental actors’ discretionary
policy decisions from “judicial review or interference.”51 With “these ob-
servations in mind,”52 the supreme court held the exception applied to
the district’s decisions about the dam that the parents complained of,53
found its immunity was therefore not waived, and rendered judgment dis-
missing the parents’ claims.54
The Supreme Court also addressed waiver of governmental immunity
43. Id. at 303–04.
44. Id. at 304. The supreme court agreed with the dissenting court of appeals judge,
explaining in “terms of the everyday experience of driving, we think it self-evident that
ensuring your car will not roll away after you leave it, including engagement of the emer-
gency brake when necessary, is an integral part of the ‘operation or use’ of a vehicle.” Id.
45. Id. at 304–06.
46. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056 (providing an exception to the
waivers of immunity otherwise provided by the Texas Tort Claims Act for claims based on
“(1) the failure of a governmental unit to perform an act that the unit is not required by
law to perform”; or (2) acts in which the governmental unit’s performance or nonperform-
ance is by law left to “the discretion of the governmental unit”).
47. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (waiving governmental immu-
nity for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or
real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private party, be liable to the claim-
ant according to Texas law”).
48. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Johnson, 572 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 2019).
49. Id. at 662.
50. Id. at 665.
51. Id. at 665–68.
52. Id. at 668.
53. Id. at 670. Specifically, the court reasoned: “the District had discretion to direct its
maintenance efforts toward the dam’s intended purposes of river control and kayaking
rather than toward protection of those who inadvisably use the damn to cross the river.”
Id.
54. Id.
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under Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code,55 concluding in
two cases this Survey period that there was not a “contract subject to [the
statute]” supporting waiver.56 In the first case, the supreme court rejected
a city employee’s claim that a procedures manual policy defining “an ex-
plicit pay schedule for on-call time” constituted a unilateral contract that
waived immunity under the statute.57 Focusing on the definition of a
“contract subject to this subchapter,”58 the supreme court held that the
policy was “not a valid written contract subject to a waiver.”59 The su-
preme court distinguished a policy within the city’s manual from ordi-
nances it had previously held could create enforceable contracts.60
Further, the supreme court reasoned that even if a manual could create
an enforceable contract, the manual in this case expressly disclaimed any
such contractual intent.61 Thus, the city’s immunity was not waived and
the employee’s claim for breach of the policy was dismissed.62
In the second case, the Texas Supreme Court held that a governmental
entity’s promise to “make an effort to agree” to a higher payment in good
faith did not contain “the essential terms of a legally enforceable agree-
ment.”63 There, a consulting firm who agreed to a $50,000.00 cap on its
compensation otherwise based on cost-reductions obtained over a three-
year contract sought to enforce Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport’s
promise to “make a good faith effort to receive board authorization to
increase the compensation.”64 The firm claimed entitlement to over
$300,000.00 in absence of the cap and requested that the airport board
authorize the higher amount. When the board denied the request, the
firm sued and the airport asserted immunity.65 After determining that the
airport entered into the consulting contract as part of its governmental
functions,66 the supreme court turned to whether the airport’s good-faith
55. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152 (authorizing local governmental entities to
enter into contracts and waiving “immunity to suit for the purposes of adjudicating a claim
[under] the contract”).
56. City of Denton v. Rushing, 570 S.W.3d 708, 709–10 (Tex. 2019); Dallas/Fort Worth
Int’l Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 362, 368–72 (Tex. 2019).
57. Rushing, 570 S.W.3d at 709.
58. Id. at 710–11 (citing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)). The supreme
court requires a contract to satisfy five elements to find waiver: “(1) the contract must be in
writing, (2) state the essential terms of the agreement, (3) provide goods or services, (4) to
the local governmental entity, and (5) be executed on behalf of the local governmental
entity.” Id. at 711.
59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 712 (discussing City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 137–39 (Tex. 2011)
(holding that city ordinance providing for specific compensation to firefighters for over-
time and termination pay could be considered a unilateral contract)).
61. Id. at 711. The manual’s disclaimer read: “[t]he contents of this manual do not in
any way constitute the terms of a contract of employment.” Id.
62. Id. at 713.
63. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 362, 371
(Tex. 2019).
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 366–67 (applying the governmental versus proprietary distinction discussed
in Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 434 n.7 (Tex. 2016) (“Was-
son I”) and Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 559 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2018)
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efforts promise was a “contract” subject to waiver.67 Relying on its prior
holdings that “agreements to negotiate toward a future contract are not
legally enforceable,” the supreme court held that the promise sued on did
“not state the essential terms of a legally enforceable agreement” and
thus did not waive the airport’s immunity under the statute.68
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A number of cases addressed interesting service of process issues this
Survey period. In Latter and Blum of Texas, LLC v. Murphy,69 the Sec-
ond Fort Worth Court of Appeals set aside a default judgment for failure
to strictly comply with service rules even though there was an answer on
file for the defaulted party.70 The particular service failure was the return
for service effected by registered mail had not been signed by the ad-
dressee registered agent as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
107.71 On appeal of the trial court’s denial of the defaulted party’s motion
for new trial, the court of appeals noted that the answer filed on its behalf
raised “an initial hurdle to” the defaulted party’s service of process com-
plaints.72 The defaulted party acknowledged the answer but asserted that
the attorney who filed it had no authority to do so and submitted affida-
vits from the attorney and its registered agent.73 The court of appeals
found that those affidavits rebutted the presumption and established the
defaulting party did not authorize the attorney “to act on its behalf in any
respect in this lawsuit.”74 The court of appeals therefore held that the
(“Wasson II”)). Wasson I and Wasson II were discussed, respectively, in the 2016 and 2018
Survey periods. See Amanda Sotak et al., Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial, 5 SMU ANN.
TEX. SURV. 81 (2019), available at https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1075&context=smuatxs [https://perma.cc/J8NZ-3UNT]; Amanda Sotak et al., Civil Proce-
dure: Pre-Trial & Trial, 3 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 69 (2017), available at https://scholar.
smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=smuatxs. [https://perma.cc/Z4BD-
W4EC].
67. Vizant Techs., 576 S.W.3d at 368–71 (analyzing the “subject to this subchapter”
contract definition found in TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2) discussed above).
68. Id. at 371.
69. No. 02-17-00463-CV, 2019 WL 3755765 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem op.).
70. Id. at *9.
71. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(c), which provides: “When the citation was served by regis-
tered or certified mail as authorized by Rule 106, the return by the officer or authorized
person must also contain the return receipt with the addressee’s signature.” In Murphy,
although process was mailed to the defendant’s registered agent, Peter Merritt, the “return
receipt was signed by someone whose first name is Amanda.” Murphy, 2019 WL 3755765,
at *1, *9.
72. Murphy, 2019 WL 3755765, at *8 (citing and quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 121 (provid-
ing that “[a]n answer shall constitute an appearance . . . so as to dispense with the necessity
for the issuance or service of citation upon him”)).
73. In the affidavits, the attorney stated he had never had any contact with the de-
faulted party, only intended to answer on behalf of another party he represented, the state-
ment in the answer that it was on behalf of the defaulted party was “an error,” and he had
no authority to act for the defaulted party; and the registered agent stated that he was the
person authorized to accept service at all relevant times and had never received the certi-
fied mail addressed to him, and if another person received it, that person was not author-
ized to do so and also did not forward it to him. Id. at *4.
74. Id. at *8.
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defaulting party was not precluded from complaining about improper ser-
vice by the unauthorized answer and reversed the default judgment.75
Two bill of review petitioners did not fare as well in Maree v. Zuniga.76
In that case, the petitioners sought to set aside a judgment rendered
against them when they failed to appear for trial after an unauthorized
attorney answered for them and then withdrew without notice.77 The
judgment creditor moved for summary judgment on the petitioners’ bill
of review claim, which the trial court granted.78 On appeal, the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals held that petitioners failed to raise a
fact issue on lack of proper service of process and thus affirmed the sum-
mary judgment.79 The court of appeals rejected the entity petitioner’s ar-
gument that the return certificate for service effected through the Texas
Secretary of State’s office by certified mail was required to show that
process was sent to its “most recent address on file.”80 While the statute
required service to be sent to the most recent address, the court of ap-
peals held it plainly did not require “either the citation or the certificate
issued by the Secretary of State” to reflect it had been sent to that ad-
dress.81 Further, the court of appeals reasoned that absent fraud or mis-
take, which the petitioners had not alleged or shown, the certificate was
“conclusive evidence that the Secretary of State, as agent of [entity peti-
tioner] received service of process for [entity petitioner] and forwarded
the service as required by the statute.”82 With respect to the individual
petitioner, petitioners asserted that fourteen documents they claimed
were “the record” in the underlying case showed no return of service on
file for him.83 The court of appeals held those documents were com-
pletely unauthenticated by affidavit or otherwise and thus were not com-
petent summary judgment evidence.84 The court of appeals also rejected
75. Id.
76. 577 S.W.3d 595, 601–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
77. Like the defaulting party in Murphy, the petitioners claimed the attorney who filed
an answer on their behalf was not authorized to do so and that they never received proper
service of process. Id. at 598. However, unlike in Murphy, the petitioners did not discover
the adverse judgment until nearly a year after entry and after all post-trial motion and
appeal deadlines passed, leaving them only equitable bill of review proceedings to chal-
lenge the judgment. Id. at 600.
78. Id. at 599–600.
79. Id. at 601. The court of appeals “presume[d], without deciding,” that the attorney
was unauthorized and thus the petitioners were not bound by the answer, and the Caldwell
v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. 2004) line of no-answer default judgment cases applied. Id.
“Under these presumptions,” the court of appeals reasoned that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment on petitioners’ bill of review unless they “carried the burden of
raising a genuine fact issue that each of them was not properly served with process.” Id.
80. The entity petitioner relied on TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.253(b), which
provided that “[t]he notice must be . . . addressed to the most recent address of [entity
petitioner] on file with the secretary of state.” Id. at 602.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing and quoting Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401
(Tex. 1986)).
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id. (reasoning that “the complete absence of authentication of the Purported
Court Documents amounts to a substantive defect that is not waived by the failure to
object and obtain a ruling in the trial court”).
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the argument that the individual petitioner’s testimony that “no one”
ever personally served him and he never received anything by mail raised
a fact issue because “valid service of process properly could be effected
on” him without either occurrence.85
Finally, a $13 million default judgment was set aside based on a return
of service that did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 10786 in
Propel Financial Services, LLC v. Conquer Land Utilities, LLC.87 At the
time the default judgment was entered, the return on file was a “digital
return receipt from the United States Postal Service”88 that was “not
signed by the person who served the citation,” “was not attached to any
documents,” and failed to “identify the court in which the case was filed
and a description of what was served.”89 The Thirteenth Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals noted that even if the clerk’s file
stamp on the receipt was considered the serving officer’s signature, Rule
107 distinguished between and required both a “certificate of return” and
“return receipt” for service effected by certified mail.90 Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that the defective return receipt showed on the face
of the record that the service attempt was invalid91 and reversed the de-
fault judgment.92
IV. VENUE
Two cases in this Survey period raised due order of pleadings issues
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87.93 In In re Good Shepherd Hospi-
tal, Inc., the Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals held the trial court abused
its discretion by setting a summary judgment motion for hearing “imme-
diately after hearing and ruling” on a venue transfer motion because Rule
87 required it to rule on venue “a reasonable time prior to commence-
ment of the trial on the merits.”94 The relator there sought mandamus
relief when the trial court set the opposing party’s motion for partial sum-
85. Id. at 605 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b), which allows, upon motion, service by any
manner that is shown “will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the
suit”).
86. TEX. R. CIV. P. 107 (providing requirements for returns of service).
87. 579 S.W.3d 485, 491–93 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, pet. denied).
88. Id. at 488 (referring to an image of the defective return).
89. Id. at 492 (noting the “return receipt does not comply with Rule 107 in many re-
spects” and citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(b), (e)).
90. Id. at 492 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(c)).
91. Id. at 493. The court of appeals refused to consider an amended, compliant return
of service submitted after the trial court’s plenary power had expired because the order
amending the defective return under TEX. R. CIV. P. 118 was void and ineffective. Id. at
491.
92. Id. at 493.
93. Rule 87(1) provides that “[t]he determination of a motion to transfer venue shall
be made promptly by the court,” “must be made in a reasonable time prior to commence-
ment of the trial on the merits,” the movant “has a duty to” request a setting on the trans-
fer motion, and “each party is entitled to at least 45 days notice” of any hearing. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 87(1).
94. In re Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 572 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2019, orig. proceeding).
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mary judgment for hearing at the same time and date as relator’s motion
to transfer venue, albeit “after (i) the Court ha[d] held a hearing on and
signed an order deciding” the venue motion.95 The court of appeals first
discussed the interplay between Rule 87(1) and Texas Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 84,96 concluding the clear intent of Rule 84 was to prevent pro-
ceedings on the merits before a court determined “whether venue was
properly before it.”97 Next, the court of appeals considered whether hear-
ing a partial motion for summary judgment was “commencement of a trial
on the merits” within the meaning of Rule 87(1).98 Finding the trial court
would necessarily “reach one of the substantive claims” of the live peti-
tion, the court of appeals held that the trial court “starts,” “begins,” or
“has commenced with the trial on the merits for purposes of Rule 87(1)”
when it takes up a motion for partial summary judgment.99 Because the
court of appeals did not “consider the trial court’s determination of venue
made immediately prior to conducting a hearing on the merits” as “a rea-
sonable time prior” required by Rule 87(1), it granted mandamus relief
directing the trial court to reset the summary judgment motion for hear-
ing a reasonable time after ruling on venue.100
The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment in one case and a turnover order in another based on the trial
court’s failure to rule on the defendant’s motion to transfer venue “prior
to proceeding with any other motions.”101 After passing an initial hearing
on the venue motion to allow time for settlement negotiations, the defen-
dant repeatedly asked that the motion to transfer be set for hearing “as
soon as practicable and, at the very latest,” prior to the hearing set on the
plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.102 In response to the summary
judgment motion, the defendant re-urged his motion to transfer venue
before addressing the merits of the summary judgment and asked at the
summary judgment hearing to be heard on venue before the trial court
proceeded on the merits.103 Without addressing venue, the trial court
granted the summary judgment motion and entered final judgment and
later a turnover order accordingly.104 On appeal, the court of appeals
95. Id. at 318.
96. Id. at 319 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 84, which states: “The defendant in his answer
may plead as many several matters as, whether of law or fact, as he may think necessary for
his defense . . . and such matters shall be heard in such order as may be directed by the
court, special appearance and motion to transfer venue, and the practice thereunder being
excepted herefrom”).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 320.
99. Id. at 321.
100. Id. at 322.
101. ASI Aviation, LLC v. Arnold & Itkin, LLP, Nos. 13-16-00612-CV & 13-17-00122-
CV, 2018 WL 6217699, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 29, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *1–2.
104. Id. at *2.
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considered Rule 87(1), Rule 84, and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86,105
emphasizing that all three consistently “demand[ ] a due order of plead-
ing to prevent the court from proceeding on ‘matters related to the mer-
its’ before determining whether venue is proper.”106 Reviewing the
defendant’s efforts to have the venue motion heard, the court of appeals
held that “he adequately and properly met the procedural requirement of
[R]ule 87.”107 Because the trial court “was required to hear and deter-
mine” the venue motion “prior to ruling on the summary judgment and
proceeding with any other motions,” the court of appeals reversed the
judgment and turnover order and remanded the case back to the trial
court.108
V. PLEADINGS
In Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
adequacy of the defendant’s pleading of a limitations defense in response
to a suit on a guaranty.109 The defendant guarantor alleged that the plain-
tiff bank’s suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and the
bank moved for summary judgment arguing that the guarantor had
waived that defense in the guaranty agreement.110 The trial court granted
summary judgment and the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals af-
firmed, finding that the guarantor waived his argument that the contrac-
tual waiver was void as against public policy by failing to affirmatively
plead it under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94.111 The supreme court
disagreed, reasoning that the guarantor’s public-policy argument was not
itself an affirmative defense, but was instead a legal argument in support
of his statute-of-limitations defense.112 Moreover, the supreme court
turned the tables on the bank, holding that even if Rule 94 had required
the guarantor to plead his public-policy argument when the bank moved
for summary judgment, the bank waived its complaint about the guaran-
tor’s pleadings by failing to raise the issue with the trial court prior to
judgment.113
Two cases during the Survey period raised interesting issues regarding
the relation back of pleadings. In Cooke v. Karlseng, the Fifth Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff shareholder’s derivative claims
105. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1) (providing “[a]n objection to improper venue is waived if
not made by written motion filed prior to or concurrently with any other plea, pleading or
motion . . . .”).
106. Arnold & Itkin, 2018 WL 6217699, at *3 (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3–4.
109. Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 575 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. 2019).
110. Id. at 534.
111. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 542 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017), aff’d, 575 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. 2019).
112. Godoy, 575 S.W.3d at 536–37.
113. Id. at 537. Unfortunately for the guarantor, however, the bank got the last word on
the merits. Specifically, the supreme court held that while portions of the contractual
waiver were unenforceable, those parts that were enforceable were sufficient to defeat the
limitations defense, and the judgment against the guarantor was thus affirmed. Id. at 533.
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asserted in an amended pleading did not relate back for limitations pur-
poses to the date of the original petition, which asserted only individual
claims.114 In doing so, the court of appeals first held that the plaintiff
lacked standing to assert his individual claims, and the trial court should
have therefore dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction.115 The
court of appeals rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Section
21.563(c)(1) of the Texas Business Organizations Code116 gave him stand-
ing because it allows a trial court to treat a derivative proceeding brought
by a shareholder in a closely held corporation as a direct action for the
shareholder’s own benefit.117 The court of appeals explained that the stat-
ute does not “turn a derivative claim into an individual claim,” and the
fact that the plaintiff could have asserted a derivative claim for his own
benefit thereunder was not the same as having actually done so.118 Turn-
ing to the issue of limitations, the court of appeals then held the deriva-
tive claims did not relate back, as the plaintiff could not simply “change
hats” and create jurisdiction after limitations had run.119
The plaintiffs’ invocation of the relation back doctrine fared better in
American Bank, N.A. v. Moorehead Oil & Gas, Inc.120 There, suit was
originally filed naming three trusts as plaintiffs.121 Some months later,
after limitations had expired, an amended petition was filed that properly
designated the trustees as the plaintiffs rather than the trusts.122 The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the trustees’ claims were
time-barred.123 The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Ap-
peals disagreed, holding that the amended petition related back.124 The
court of appeals reasoned that this type of misidentification of the plain-
tiff did not raise the same kinds of policy concerns as those that accom-
pany a misidentification of the defendant.125 Because the defendant was
not misled, or otherwise prejudiced or disadvantaged by the initial erro-
neous designation of the trusts as plaintiffs, the statute of limitations did
not bar the trustees’ suit.126
VI. DISCOVERY
In In re City of Dickinson, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
intersection of the expert disclosure rules and the attorney–client privi-
114. Cooke v. Karlseng, No. 05-18-00206-CV, 2019 WL 3812060, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 14, 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
115. Id. at *4–5.
116. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.563(c)(1).
117. Id.; Cooke, 2019 WL 3812060, at *4.
118. Cooke, 2019 WL 3812060, at *4.
119. Id. at *7.
120. No. 13-17-00641-CV, 2018 WL 6219635 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Nov. 29, 2018, no pet.).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *4.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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lege.127 The plaintiff city complained of the defendant insurer’s underpay-
ment of a property-damage claim, and in its response to the city’s motion
for summary judgment, the insurer attached an affidavit from its senior
claims examiner and corporate representative that included factual and
expert testimony.128 During the affiant’s deposition, the city learned that
his affidavit had been revised through an email exchange with the in-
surer’s counsel.129 In response to the city’s motion to compel the produc-
tion of those emails and related communications, the insurer asserted the
attorney–client privilege and, presumably inadvertently, filed many of the
emails with the trial court.130 The next day, the insurer invoked the
“snap-back” provision in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) to have
the city delete or destroy the emails.131 The trial court granted the city’s
motion to compel and denied the insurer’s motion to withdraw its filing
of the emails, but the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals conditionally
granted mandamus relief directing that both orders be set aside, finding
that the emails and related communications were privileged, notwith-
standing the affiant’s status as a testifying expert.132
The city sought mandamus relief from the supreme court, contending
that Texas Civil Procedure Rules 192.3(e)(6) and 194.2(f)(4)(A) applied
and required the production of everything the affiant reviewed in antici-
pation of his expert testimony.133 In response, the insurer pointed to the
comment to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194, which contemplated the
waiver of the work product exemption (but not other privileges), and ar-
gued that a privilege waiver should not ensue each time a party wants to
elicit expert testimony from one of its employees.134 The Texas Supreme
127. In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex. 2019).
128. Id. at 644.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Rule 193.3(d) provides:
Privilege Not Waived by Production. A party who produces material or infor-
mation without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that
claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence if—within ten days or a
shorter time ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discov-
ers that such production was made—the producing party amends the re-
sponse, identifying the material or information produced and stating the
privilege asserted. If the producing party thus amends the response to assert
a privilege, the requesting party must promptly return the specified material
or information and any copies pending any ruling by the court denying the
privilege.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d). In In re Fedd Wireless LLC, another “snap-back” case this Survey
period, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that a party’s request for privileged
material submitted with its traditional motion for summary judgment was untimely because
its attorney in charge certified pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 that he had
read the motion nearly a month before, making the request well outside the ten-day period
from “actual[ ] discover[y]” allowed to “invoke the [ ] snap-back provision.” In re Fedd
Wireless, LLC, 567 S.W.3d 470, 476–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig.
proceeding).
132. In re Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 549 S.W.3d 592, 598, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
133. In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d at 645.
134. Id.
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Court denied mandamus relief, finding that the court of appeals had
properly found that the emails and related communications were ex-
empted from disclosure by the attorney–client privilege.135 According to
the supreme court, although Rule 192.3(e)(6) permits discovery of the
documents provided to or reviewed by a testifying expert, nothing in that
Subsection overcomes Rule 192.3(a), which authorizes the discovery of
relevant information “that is not privileged.”136
The supreme court then turned its attention to Rule 194.2, which per-
mits a party to request the disclosure of documents that “have been pro-
vided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for” a testifying expert.137
Somewhat amazingly, the supreme court found that this rule permits a
party to request disclosure but does not require disclosure.138 As such,
Rule 194.2 did not obligate the insurer to turn over any testifying expert
materials.139 To further buttress its decision, the supreme court pointed to
Rule 194.3(b), which requires disclosure “unless otherwise ordered by the
court,” and the official comments to Rule 194, which allow privilege as-
sertions except for work product.140
The propriety of death-penalty sanctions was the subject of McKeithan
v. Condit.141 The plaintiff attorney sued his former client for breach of
contract and fraud, and she counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty
and fraud.142 The attorney added a declaratory-judgment claim, in which
he alleged that the client’s real property was not her homestead, and the
trial court severed his other claims into a separate action.143 The attorney
sought sanctions in the declaratory-judgment action for the client’s dis-
covery misconduct, and the trial court granted the motion, struck her
pleadings, and barred her from testifying on the issue at trial.144
The client appealed and challenged the sanctions award on three
grounds: (1) the trial court did not first impose lesser sanctions; (2) the
sanctions were not proportional; and (3) the sanctions were excessive.145
The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that notwithstanding the trial court’s lengthy recitation of the cli-
ent’s discovery misconduct, there was no indication, in either the record
135. Id. at 649–50. The supreme court also held that the “snap-back” provision in Rule
193.3(d) warranted the return to the insurer of the documents it filed in error. Id. at 649.
136. Id. at 646 (“Because [Rule 192.3(e)(6)] does not otherwise waive the attor-
ney–client privilege to withhold testifying expert materials from discovery, we conclude
that these attorney–client communications remain privileged under this rule.”).
137. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(f)(4)(A)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 647.
140. Id. (The supreme court distinguishing its decision in In re Christus Spohn Hosp.
Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. 2007), on the ground that the internal investigative report in
that case was work product, not an attorney–client communication). Id. at 648.
141. No. 13-16-00348-CV, 2018 WL 6219624 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Nov. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *2.
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or the recitation, that the trial court had imposed, or even considered,
lesser sanctions.146 The trial court also failed to explain why lesser sanc-
tions could not have ameliorated the alleged discovery abuse or that such
abuse justified a presumption that her claims were meritless.147
In Medina v. Zuniga, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the propriety
of sanctions following a defendant’s decision to concede liability at trial in
derogation of his denial of liability-related requests for admissions.148 The
defendant denied all of the plaintiff’s requests for admissions regarding
his alleged negligence, but during opening statement, his counsel stated,
for the first time, that he was conceding his negligence.149 The plaintiff
moved post-trial under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.4 to recover
the attorneys’ fees and expenses she had incurred in establishing the de-
fendant’s negligence.150 In response, the defendant asserted that, at the
time he denied the requests at issue, he had a reasonable basis to believe
he might prevail on liability,151 and he also argued that the plaintiff was
not prejudiced because she would have had to put on the same evidence
for her negligence claim as she did for her gross-negligence claim.152
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
granting of the plaintiff’s motion,153 but the supreme court reversed and
rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing on her motion.154 As
part of its analysis, the supreme court reiterated its longstanding objec-
tion to the use of requests for admissions to have a party admit that it did
not have a cause of action or a defense155 and noted its more recent con-
cern that merits-preclusive deemed admissions can have due process im-
146. Id. at *3–5. The court of appeals rejected the lawyer’s claim that the trial court had
issued a lesser sanction by ordering the client to appear for her deposition. Id. at *6.
147. Id. at *5. In contrast, the Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s imposition of death-penalty sanctions where the trial court had imposed lesser sanc-
tions to no avail and the withheld documents were critical to the calculation of the amount
of the plaintiff’s losses. See Trishe Res., Inc. v. Hilliard Energy, Ltd., No. 11-18-00086-CV,
2019 WL 4232226, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 6, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
148. Medina v. Zuniga, 593 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. 2019).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 243. Rule 215.4(b) provides:
Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any
document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 198 and if the
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the doc-
ument or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 193, or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that he
might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the fail-
ure to admit.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.4(b).
151. Medina, 593 S.W.3d at 244 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.4(b)).
152. Id.
153. Zuniga v. Medina, 565 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017) (mem. op.),
rev’d, 593 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. 2019).
154. Medina, 593 S.W.3d at 250.
155. Id. at 244 (citing Sanders v. Harder, 227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. 1950)).
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plications.156 According to the supreme court, the trial court’s order
essentially presented the defendant with two unpalatable options: either
admit away his case at the outset or face sanctions later.157 Even though
the payment of a sanctions award was lighter than merits-preclusive
deemed admissions, the supreme court held that, just as a party can file a
general denial regarding the claims against him, he can deny in good faith
a merits-preclusive request for admission on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof.158
Deemed admissions were also at issue in Romero v. D.R. Kidd Com-
pany, Inc.159 After the plaintiff filed a notice of deemed admissions, the
defendant belatedly served responses denying all of the requests.160 The
plaintiff moved for summary judgment based in part on the deemed ad-
missions, and the defendant filed his response to that motion and a mo-
tion to strike the deemed admissions, which he did not reference in his
response.161 The trial court entered summary judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor without specifying the grounds, and in his motion for new trial, the
defendant alluded to, but did not seek a ruling on, his motion to strike.162
The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and the defendant
appealed.163
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial and
allowing the merits-preclusive admissions to remain in place.164 Initially,
the court of appeals rejected the plaintiff’s waiver claim finding that even
though the defendant did not set his motion to strike for hearing and did
not raise the issue at the summary-judgment hearing, the argument could
be raised for the first time in a motion for new trial.165
Next, the court of appeals addressed whether the defendant had actu-
ally received the requests for admissions. Even though the plaintiff’s law
firm had requested its process server to serve the requests for admissions,
they were not listed among the served documents on the citation, and the
defendant denied receiving them.166 Moreover, the defendant answered
the requests for admissions within hours of receiving the notice of
deemed admissions, and he did so over a month before the plaintiff filed
its motion for summary judgment.167 Finally, since the admissions at issue
were merits-preclusive, the plaintiff had the burden of showing that the
156. Id. at 245 (citing Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2011)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 245–46.
159. No. 14-18-00057-CV, 2019 WL 2939253 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *1–2.
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id. at *2–3.
164. Id. at *8.
165. Id. at *4 (citing Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442–43 (Tex. 2005)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at *5.
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defendant’s failure to respond resulted from flagrant bad faith or a cal-
lous disregard of the rules.168 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff
had failed to make the required showing and that the trial court had
abused its discretion in its rulings.169
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reached a comparable re-
sult in PEM Offshore Inc. v. Index Brook Ltd.170 In his disclosure re-
sponses, the individual defendant (who was then pro se) provided an
address that the plaintiff used to serve the defendant with requests for
admissions. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment based on the
deemed admissions, and its supporting evidence included the envelope
from its mailing of the requests for admissions, which was unclaimed and
marked “return to sender.”171 The defendant served responses to the re-
quests for admissions and a motion to strike the deemed admissions,
which was based on its failure to receive the requests.172 In their response
to the motion for summary judgment, defendant argued the plaintiff had
failed to show defendant acted with the requisite “bad faith or callous
disregard” necessary to warrant the entry of summary judgment based on
merits-preclusive deemed admissions.173 The trial court denied the mo-
tion to strike and entered summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor,174
but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the undisputed evidence
showing the defendant had not received the requests for admissions pre-
vented the plaintiff from establishing the defendant’s bad faith or callous
disregard.175
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Texas Courts of Appeals grappled with several noteworthy sum-
mary judgment issues this Survey period. In Tri-Stem, Ltd. v. City of
Houston, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the city’s motion for summary
judgment “before [the opposing party contractor] had sufficient opportu-
nity to obtain material discovery, and in spite of [contractor’s] diligence
in seeking it.”176 On appeal, the contractor argued that the trial court
should have granted its motion and supplemental motion for continuance
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(g).177 The court of appeals
168. Id. at *6 (citing Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. 2011)).
169. Id.
170. No. 14-17-00990-CV, 2019 WL 386319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 31,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *4.
176. Tri-Stem, Ltd. v. City of Hous., 566 S.W.3d 789, 798–801 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
177. Rule 166a(g) provides “[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
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agreed, noting the city filed its motion for summary judgment “six weeks
after the trial court signed the parties’ agreed docket control order, two
weeks after [contractor’s] counsel noticed the deposition of the City’s
designated representative,”178 “three days after the city served its objec-
tions and responses” to the contractor’s written discovery, and when
“eleven months remained in the discovery period.”179 The court of ap-
peals emphasized that the contractor “promptly moved” for the continu-
ance and to compel more complete discovery responses by the city and
explained what discovery was necessary and why.180 The trial court heard
the contractor’s motion for continuance and the city’s summary judgment
motion and objections to the contractor’s summary judgment evidence
“at the same time,” denied the continuance, sustained the evidentiary ob-
jections, and granted the city summary judgment.181 The court of appeals
explained the “harm from the denial of the motion for continuance is
shown” by the order sustaining the city’s objections to the contractor’s
summary judgment evidence insofar as the contractor had “no opportu-
nity to substitute sworn testimony for the unauthenticated” materials to
overcome hearsay objections.182 The summary judgment was reversed
and the case remanded “to allow [the contractor] to conduct further
discovery.”183
In another case, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed a
number of evidentiary issues in summary judgment practice.184 First, the
court of appeals rejected the non-movant’s argument that because the
trial court sustained its objections to pleadings contained in two exhibits,
an included affidavit was also excluded.185 The court of appeals explained
that “[p]leadings and affidavits have distinct meanings” and determined
the affidavit “included specific, detailed facts concerning the parties’ con-
tract and interactions,” was thus “‘more than’ a pleading,” and was there-
fore within the “scope of review” on appeal.186 Next, the court of appeals
considered the non-movant’s authentication objections to materials sub-
mitted pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(d).187 The court of
appeals agreed that movant could not simply “authenticate a document
make such other further order as is just.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g). See also Tri-Stem, 566
S.W.3d at 799 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 251 and TEX. R. CIV. P. 252 as other available ave-
nues for a “party requiring discovery to justify its opposition to a summary-judgment mo-
tion” to seek a continuance).
178. Tri-Stem, 566 S.W.3d at 799. The city moved to quash the deposition within three




181. Id. at 799–800.
182. Id. at 800.
183. Id. at 801.
184. Tex. Black Iron, Inc. v. Arwak Energy Int’l Ltd., 566 S.W.3d 801, 811–13, 824 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 811–12.
187. Id. at 812 (noting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(d) allows parties to “to use discovery prod-
ucts not on file with the clerk as summary-judgment evidence” upon timely notice).
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for use in its own favor by merely producing it in response to a discovery
request” and considered whether the movant’s objected-to exhibits were
properly authenticated summary judgment evidence.188 The court of ap-
peals found exhibits also attached to the non-movant’s response and ex-
hibits containing emails discussed in deposition were adequately
authenticated while other emails were not, and excluded the unauthenti-
cated emails from its review.189 Finally, the court of appeals held the mo-
vant had not offered any evidence of presentment as required to obtain
summary judgment on its claim for attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code190 because (1) its demand
letter offered as an exhibit was not authenticated and thus was not com-
petent evidence; and (2) even if it were, “evidence showing presentment
of only a portion (here, less than half) of a party’s contract claim” cannot
“conclusively establish[ ]” presentment of “attorney’s fees on the party’s
whole contract claim for purposes of summary judgment.”191
In Gonzales v. Thorndale Cooperative Gin and Grain Co., the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed whether a letter from a trial
judge identifying the ground on which summary judgment was granted
was “incorporated into” the final judgment and held, “[o]n the facts of
this appeal,” it was not.192 In this “slip and fall” case, the premises owner
moved for summary judgment on two distinct grounds: no duty to warn
about open and obvious hazards and the ferae naturae doctrine.193 The
trial court’s final judgment granting the motion did not specify the sum-
mary judgment ground or grounds it was based on.194 The plaintiff on
appeal only raised error with regard to the duty to warn issue without
“challenging the independent, alternative ferae naturae basis for the trial
court’s decision.”195 The court of appeals recognized that plaintiff’s omis-
sion was likely based on the trial judge’s letter, stating he “had ‘concluded
that the alleged hazards on [owner’s] property were open, obvious and
known to [plaintiff], and as such, [owner] had no duty to [plaintiff] with
respect to those hazards. . . .’”196 Nonetheless, the court of appeals held
that plaintiff’s failure to challenge the alternative basis doomed his ap-
188. Id. at 812–813.
189. Id. at 813.
190. Id. at 824 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(2) and noting a
“prerequisite to recovering attorney’s fees under chapter 38 is presentment of the underly-
ing claim to the opposing party or her agent”).
191. Id.
192. Gonzales v. Thorndale Coop. Gin & Grain Co., 578 S.W.3d 655, 656 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
193. Id. at 656–57 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Nami, 498 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2016)
(explaining the doctrine provides “a property owner owes an invitee no duty of care to
protect him from wild animals indigenous to the area unless” the owner has domesticated
the animals, attracted them to the property, or “knows of an unreasonable risk and neither
mitigates the risk nor warns the invitee”)).
194. Id. at 657.
195. Id.
196. Id. The court of appeals noted the owner’s brief on appeal reflected it “also may
have been operating under the misimpression that the trial court” did not rule on the ferae
naturae ground of its summary judgment motion. Id.
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peal.197 While acknowledging the rule “may seem harsh,” the court of
appeals reasoned that it furthered “clarity and simplicity” in summary
judgment practice.198 Further, the court of appeals emphasized that plain-
tiff could have filed “a timely motion for reconsideration” asking the trial
court to specify the basis of its summary judgment ruling to limit the final
judgment.199 Having failed to do so, plaintiff was required to negate all
potential grounds supporting the trial court’s “general order.”200
Finally, the Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a statement
made in a debtor’s reply constituted a judicial admission precluding the
trial court from granting the debtor summary judgment on a limitations
affirmative defense.201 The debtor filed a cross-motion to the bank’s mo-
tion for summary judgment on the debt, claiming the bank’s claim was
barred by limitations.202 The bank filed an untimely response to the cross-
motion three days before the hearing to which the debtor replied the day
before the summary judgment hearing.203 At that hearing, the trial court
found the bank failed to submit any summary judgment evidence it could
consider and granted the debtor’s cross-motion.204 On appeal, the bank
argued that there was a fact issue on limitations based on the debtor’s
concession in the reply while the debtor asserted the reply was “a nullity”
because the trial court sustained the objections to the bank’s late-filed
response.205 The court of appeals rejected the debtor’s argument, found
the reply was filed “and made [ ] part of the [summary judgment] re-
cord,” and contained “unequivocal” statements that constituted judicial
admissions.206
VIII. JURY CHARGE
In Pathfinder Oil & Gas Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the impact of the parties’ stipulation on the
need to include elements in the jury charge.207 The parties were disputing
the enforceability of a letter agreement, and the day before trial, they
entered into a stipulation providing that the only issues to be submitted
to the jury were: (1) whether the letter agreement was enforceable; (2)
whether one or both of the parties breached the agreement; and (3) the




201. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Riley, No. 09-18-00403-CV, 2019 WL 5075866, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Apr. 15, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id. The debtor’s reply contained statements about the bank’s actions that “con-
ceded a fact undermining” the debtor’s limitations defense. Id. at *6.
204. Id. at *3.
205. Id. at *5 n.5.
206. Id. at *5 (citing and quoting Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.
1974) (“In that case, pleadings may be used as summary judgment evidence when they
contain statements rising to the level of judicially admitting a fact or conclusion which is
directly adverse to that party’s theory or defense of recovery.”).
207. Pathfinder Oil & Gas Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019).
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applicability of various affirmative defenses.208 The parties also stipulated
that, if the jury found that the agreement was enforceable and had been
breached by the plaintiff, then the defendant, which had agreed to waive
its claim for money damages, was entitled to specific performance.209 The
proposed charge tracked the stipulation, but at the charge conference, the
plaintiff requested the inclusion of a question regarding whether the de-
fendant had at all times been ready, willing, and able to perform its obli-
gations, which is one of the traditional elements of a claim for specific
performance.210 The trial court declined to submit this question in light of
the stipulation, and after the jury found in favor of the defendant on the
first three questions, the trial court ordered specific performance.211
The Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiff, finding that the stipulation limited the defendant’s
recovery to specific performance but did not excuse the defendant from
having to establish its entitlement to that relief.212 The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed and reversed, finding that the stipulation was a litigation-
related contract through which the plaintiff waived or eliminated the de-
fendant’s burden of demonstrating its entitlement to specific perform-
ance.213 Because the defendant was not required to secure a jury finding
on its entitlement to specific performance, the supreme court remanded
the case so that the court of appeals could consider the unaddressed ap-
pellate issues.214
The trial court’s refusal to submit requested instructions was at issue in
Estate of Durrill.215 In that case, the testator’s children sought a declara-
tion under Section 123.102 of the Texas Estates Code that he had lacked
the mental capacity to marry his purported spouse.216 The purported
spouse requested jury instructions on (1) the statutory presumption that
every marriage is valid, and (2) the effect of filing a declaration of infor-
mal marriage.217 The trial court voided the marriage, and on appeal, the
purported spouse complained of its failure to include her proposed jury
instructions.218 The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, finding that the requested instructions did not further the
goal of determining the decedent’s mental capacity and constituted im-
208. Id. at 885.
209. Id. at 885–86.
210. Id. at 886 (citing DiGuiseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Tex. 2008)).
211. Id.
212. Great W. Drilling, Ltd. v. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc., 568 S.W.3d 148, 154–56 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2017) (mem. op.), rev’d, 574 S.W.3d 882, 892 (Tex. 2019).
213. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, 574 S.W.3d at 890–92.
214. Id. at 893.
215. 570 S.W.3d 945 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, pet. denied).
216. Id. at 948. This Section permits an interested person to request the court to void
the decedent’s marriage based on the lack of mental capacity where the decedent was
married on the date of his death and the marriage had commenced not earlier than three
years before his death. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 123.102(a).
217. Estate of Durrill, 570 S.W.3d at 962.
218. Id. at 947, 963.
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proper comments on the weight of the evidence.219
In Getty v. Perryman, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the potential waiver of a jury question on lack of considera-
tion.220 The plaintiff filed suit to recover the $125,000.00 he lost in a failed
investment plus an additional $25,000.00 he contended the defendant had
agreed to pay him.221 The jury found that an agreement existed and that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover $150,000.00 in actual damages plus an
additional $80,000.00 in attorney’s fees.222 After the trial court entered a
final judgment that was consistent with the jury’s findings, the defendant
appealed, and his appellate complaints included an argument that the
parties’ agreement was void due to lack of consideration.223 Because the
defendant had neither pled nor secured a jury finding on lack of consider-
ation, the court of appeals easily found he had waived this issue.224
IX. JUDGMENTS
In Harris County Hospital District v. Public Utility Commission, the
Third Austin Court of Appeals rejected a collateral attack on a twenty-
year-old judgment that was entered in connection with a class action set-
tlement, consistent with the “modern trend favoring finality and cer-
tainty.”225 There, a hospital district filed a complaint over telephone
charges with the Public Utility Commission (PUC).226 After “more than
three years of litigation” before the PUC, the PUC dismissed the district’s
complaint on the grounds it was precluded by a 2000 class action settle-
ment judgment resolving excessive telephone charges claims in Texas.227
A reviewing district court reversed the PUC, holding the hospital district
was not bound by the prior judgment, and all interested parties ap-
pealed.228 The court of appeals began by noting the hospital district “col-
laterally challenges a twenty-year-old class-action settlement decree
resolving tens of thousands of claims filed over two decades ago.”229 In
considering whether the judgment was subject to collateral attack,230 the
court of appeals weighed the factors “militating for and against upholding
219. Id. at 963 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 277).
220. Getty v. Perryman, No. 14-17-00887-CV, 2019 WL 1768604 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
221. Id. at *1.
222. Id. at *2–3.
223. Id. at *3, *5.
224. Id. at *5.
225. Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 577 S.W.3d 370, 378 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2019, pet. filed) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (AM.
LAW INST. 1982)).
226. Id. at 374.
227. Id. at 376.
228. Id. at 377.
229. Id.
230. Id. (explaining “collateral challenge is proper” only if the judgment is void, and a
“judgment is void only if ‘the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or
property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judg-
ment, or no capacity to act’”) (citation omitted).
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the validity of the challenged judgment” and found “every relevant fac-
tor” in this case weighed in favor of finality.231 The court of appeals
therefore held that the district, which “had ample opportunity to litigate
its jurisdictional challenge,” could not challenge the final class action
judgment.232
X. MISCELLANEOUS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the arbitrability of disputes in two
significant cases during the Survey period. In the supreme court’s words,
Robinson v. Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc.233 presented
not only the ultimate issue of “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
class-action claims,” but also the “threshold issue [of] whether a court or
arbitrator is empowered to make that determination.”234 The supreme
court noted that it had answered the threshold “who decides” question
fifteen years before, holding then that where the parties’ contract com-
mitted all disputes arising out of an agreement to the arbitration, that
delegation of authority included the issue of class arbitrability.235 In
Robinson, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the
subsequent federal case authorities had effectively abrogated the legal
premise on which Wood rested and therefore declined to follow it, hold-
ing instead that where the agreement did not contain a “clear and unmis-
takable delegation” of such authority to the arbitrator, the availability of
class arbitration is a gateway issue for the court to decide.236
The supreme court agreed that the time had come to overrule Wood,
reasoning that since it was issued, “the jurisprudential landscape has
evolved to provide a clearer, and distinctly different, perspective.”237 The
supreme court noted that class arbitrations are fundamentally different
from bilateral arbitrations, involving the rights of absent class members
and a multiplicity of claims.238 The issue of class arbitration is thus “more
akin to what type of controversy shall be arbitrated—a question for the
courts—not a procedural question presumptively for the arbitrator.”239
Although the parties may override that presumption by contractually del-
231. Id. at 378 (reasoning the “challenged judgment is nearly two decades old, binds
tens of thousands of class members, was rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, and
includes a statement indicating that the court found jurisdiction over ‘all claims’ and ‘all
parties’”).
232. Id. at 378–79.
233. 590 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2019).
234. Id. at 521–22.
235. Id. at 526–27 (citing In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 368–69, 368–69 n.1 (Tex. 2004)
(per curiam)).
236. Robinson v. Home Owners Mgmt. Enters., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 226, 232–40 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2018), aff’d, 590 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2019).
237. Robinson, 590 S.W.3d at 527–28. Although the supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals’ conclusion and “thoughtful and well-written opinion,” it gently chided the
lower court for failing to recognize that it was nevertheless bound to follow Wood until the
supreme court itself overruled that decision. Id. at 528.
238. Id. at 529–30.
239. Id. at 531.
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egating the arbitrability of class actions to the arbitrator, they must do so
with unmistakable clarity and such intent cannot be inferred where their
contract is silent on the issue.240 Turning then to the ultimate issue of
whether the parties before it had agreed to arbitrate class disputes, the
supreme court had no difficulty in concluding the parties had not where
the arbitration provision in question did not refer to class claims at all.241
RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome raised the arbitrability issue in the
context of a contract to purchase a party’s right to payments under a
structured settlement.242 Newsome had sold his structured settlement
rights to RSL Funding and its related entities and, pursuant to the re-
quirements of the Structured Settlement Protection Act,243 the district
court entered an order approving the transfer.244 When a dispute over the
court’s order subsequently arose, the parties agreed to modify its terms
and the district court entered a corrected order nunc pro tunc.245 Several
months later, Newsome filed a bill of review alleging one or both of the
orders was void.246 RSL Funding moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to the terms of the purchase contract, which specifically delegated the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.247 The district court denied the
motion to compel arbitration and a divided Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
affirmed, reasoning that the approval of the transfer of a structured set-
tlement was a “purely judicial function” under the statute.248
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration.249
The supreme court first rejected the argument that the district court’s
exclusive jurisdiction of challenges to its orders by bill of review meant
that the parties could not agree to arbitrate that dispute instead.250 Find-
ing no inconsistency between the statute’s requirement of court approval
for the transfer and the arbitration of disputes related to such transfer,
the supreme court concluded that the dispute had to be sent to arbitra-
tion to allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.251
240. Id. at 531–33.
241. Id. at 534.
242. RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. 2019).
243. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 141.004.
244. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d at 118.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 119–20.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 120.
249. Id. at 126.
250. Id. at 122.
251. Id. at 122–23. The supreme court went on to reject Newsome’s argument that no
enforceable arbitration agreement existed because the purchase contract never came into
existence or was void without a valid order approving the transfer under the Structured
Settlement Protection Act. Id. at 124–25. The supreme court explained that to the extent
Newsome was asserting a defense to the contract as a whole that did not involve the issue
of contract formation, that defense would have to be decided by the arbitrator. Id. at 125.
And to the extent Newsome was claiming the statute created a condition precedent to
formation of the contract, he had waived that argument by failing to brief it on appeal. Id.
at 125–26.
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Over the last several years, the Texas Supreme Court has clarified and
made more exacting the evidentiary burden a party must meet when it
seeks to recover attorney’s fees from another party in litigation.252 In
Nath v. Children’s Hospital, the supreme court announced that these re-
quirements apply to attorneys’ fees awarded as sanctions as well, because
“all fee-shifting situations require reasonableness.”253 The supreme court
disapproved of the courts of appeals’ opinions that had reached the con-
trary conclusion,254 stating that the court of appeals had misinterpreted
Brantley v. Etter, which held that an award of attorney’s fees as sanctions
was not a jury issue, but was instead solely within the sound discretion of
the trial court.255 Nath explains that before a trial court may exercise that
discretion, there must be evidence of the reasonableness of the requested
fees or there will be no way for the court to “determine that the sanction
is ‘no more severe than necessary’ to fairly compensate the prevailing
party.”256
In re Vinson involved a non-party insurance adjuster’s challenge to an
order compelling her to appear at the mediation of a suit involving one of
her employer’s insureds.257 The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals condi-
tionally granted mandamus relief, noting that the trial court’s authority to
refer a dispute to mediation includes the power to order parties and their
representatives to attend with full settlement authority.258 Where neces-
sary, this also includes the power to require an insurance company repre-
sentative with authority to attend.259 The court of appeals explained that
does not mean, however, that the trial court may require a particular rep-
resentative of the insurer to attend, even if that representative is the most
familiar with the case.260
Finally, perhaps the most significant development to trial practitioners
during the Survey period was the Texas Legislature’s substantial revisions
to the TCPA.261 In the years since Texas first enacted this “anti-SLAPP”
statute, many came to conclude that it had been loosened from its moor-
ings as it was broadly interpreted and applied by the Texas courts to gar-
den-variety civil disputes. A thorough examination of the TCPA
amendments is beyond the scope of this article.262 Some of the most sig-
nificant changes, however, include: (1) narrowing the scope of the
TCPA’s protections by revising the definition of a “matter of public con-
252. See, e.g., Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 475
(Tex. 2019).
253. Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 576 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).
254. Id. at 709 (citing cases).
255. Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
256. Nath, 576 S.W.3d at 709.
257. In re Vinson, No. 08-18-00207-CV, 2019 WL 2417441 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 10,
2019, orig. proceeding).
258. Id. at *1–2.
259. Id. at *2.
260. Id. at *3.
261. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011.
262. A summary of all of the revisions to the TCPA may be found at Amy Bresnen &
Steve Bresnen, The 2019 Anti-SLAPP Reform Legislation, 82 TEX. B.J. 622 (2019).
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cern”;263 (2) exempting multiple new categories of cases from the stat-
ute’s reach, including actions involving non-compete agreements or
misappropriation of trade secrets;264 and (3) the elimination of
mandatory sanctions when a party prevails on a motion to dismiss under
the TCPA.265
263. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7).
264. Id. § 27.010(a).
265. Id. § 27.009(a)(2).
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